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Scientific evidence demonstrates that anthropogenic climate change is an urgent global problem with 
tremendous destructive capacity. Decades of multilateral negotiations have yielded limited success to 
date, but other responses are available. One such alternative is climate change litigation. Particularly 
interesting are recent public interest lawsuits, first in the Netherlands, and then in Pakistan, which 
have sought to hold the State responsible for climate change. This paper seeks to demystify the past, 
present, and future of climate change public interest litigation by placing it in a historical perspective, 
looking at contemporary developments, and assessing the potential of this technique for encouraging 
social change on a global scale.    
 
 
The anthropogenic alteration of the global 
climate undoubtedly represents one of the 
greatest challenges that humanity faces in 
the 21st Century. The urgency of climate 
change mitigation is reflected in the 
findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), which suggest a 
failure to restrict temperature increases to 
2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial 
levels would irrevocably and perilously 
alter the world’s climate (Peters et al., 
2013). International policymaking has, to 
date, been inadequate in dealing with 
climate change, and according to the 
findings of the IPCC’s fifth assessment 
report, the current policy baseline would 
most likely result in a temperature increase 
of well above 2 degrees (Ibid.). 
Contemporary international political 
efforts to address climate change include 
the Paris agreement, which was signed by 
the US and China (the two greatest 
emitters) and entered into force on 4 
November 2016, and the inclusion of a 
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climate target in the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). However, as 
political action has dragged its feet, climate 
litigation has emerged as a possible 
alternative method to encourage social 
change. In particular, public interest 
litigation has become an important talking 
point in contemporary debates about 
climate change subsequent to a landmark 
judgement recently issued by a Dutch 
court in the Urgenda case. In this case, the 
Hague District Court held the Dutch 
government responsible for climate 
change. The ruling, which is being 
discussed as a potential international 
precedent, was followed by a comparable 
decision by a Pakistani court in Ashgar 
Leghari v Pakistan. 
The aim of this paper is to 
investigate domestic public interest 
litigation as a potential tool in the struggle 
against climate change. The following 
research question will be addressed: 
Taking into account past and present cases, 
as well as the potential future prospects of 
this technique, can public interest litigation 
play an effective role in combating the 
global problem of climate change? In this 
context, the effectiveness of this technique 
refers to the potential for encouraging 
political action and social change.    
In addressing the research question, 
this paper will draw on case law and 
scholarly literature. Historical cases from 
the US and Indian contexts will be used as 
illustrative examples of past environ-
mental public interest litigation. In the 
contemporary context, the Urgenda, 
Leghari, and Kelsey Cascade Rose cases 
will be discussed, in addition to ongoing 
cases in Belgium and Norway, as they 
seem to signal the emergence of a new 
kind of climate change public interest 
litigation. Subsequently, climate change 
public interest litigation will be placed in a 
more analytical perspective in the 
discussion, which will be followed by 
some further comments on the future 
prospects of this technique. The discussion 
will be guided by some analytical 
questions, such as do these new cases 
constitute a global trend? and are they 
examples of (dangerous) judicial activism? 
 
I. Conceptualisation of 
public interest litigation 
and judicial activism 
 
Both in theory and practice, public interest 
litigation is a concept that is not easily 
defined, especially as it may take on a 
different shape depending on the 
jurisdiction in which it occurs. Hussain 
(1993, p. 1) defines public interest litigation 
in a broad sense as “litigation in the 
interest of the public”, where “The word 
'public' means public at large, including all 
classes and sections of society without any 
distinction of gender, social status, 
economic background, ethnic origin, 
religious credence or cultural orientation”. 
This form of litigation is often employed 
strategically as a motor for social change, 
and particularly aims to advance the cause 
of minority or disadvantaged groups, or 
individuals who have no voice (“About 







change litigation, which per definition 
seeks to protect the public interest, can 
thus be categorised as a subset of public 
interest litigation. Since climate cases 
frequently envisage the shielding of future 
generations from potential harm, they also 
aim to protect those with no voice. Though 
this cursory definition captures the spirit 
of public interest litigation, it also leaves 
many questions unanswered. Most 
notably, commentators clash over whether 
criteria for assessing public interest exist 
and, if so, what these may be. It is also 
often unclear whether a particular case 
should be considered public interest 
litigation. One of the main reasons for this 
disagreement is that there are diverging 
perspectives of what constitutes an 
advancement of social justice (Cummings 
& Rhode, 2009).  Conceptions of the exact 
confines of public interest litigation may 
also differ across jurisdictions, especially 
when it concerns two legal systems that 
are poles apart. 
“Judicial activism” is another term 
that requires some further attention. This 
concept is multifaceted, defies clear 
definition, and also varies across 
jurisdictional contexts. As Kmiec (2004, p. 
1443) points out, the exact meaning of 
judicial activism is frequently unclear, as 
“it is defined in a number of disparate, 
even contradictory ways”. He 
distinguishes between five core meanings 
of judicial activism, namely: “(1) 
invalidation of the arguably constitutional 
actions of other branches, (2) failure to 
adhere to precedent, (3) judicial 
“legislation”, (4) departures from accepted 
interpretive methodology, and (5) result-
oriented judging” (Ibid., p. 1444). In the 
context of public interest litigation, judicial 
activism can be broadly characterised as 
judges pushing the boundaries of existing 
law for political purposes. Such practices 
may run the risk of crossing these 
boundaries if not handled with sufficient 
care (Heringa, 2016, p. 203). Judicial 
activism is subject to different views 
depending on the applicable legal system. 
For instance, in Pakistan and India, judicial 
activism is embraced as an important facet 
of the respective legal traditions 
(Razzaque, 2004).  By contrast, in the US 
context, judicial activism is often imbued 
with a negative connotation (Siegel, 2010). 
Interestingly, however, both jurisdictions 
have seen high-level justices defending this 
method, at least in some contexts.  Climate 
lawsuits are frequently linked to (liberal) 
judicial activism, as was notably the case in 
relation to the Urgenda ruling. 
Accordingly, this debate will be more 
thoroughly addressed in the discussion 
section. 
 
II. Historical use of public 
interest litigation in 
relation to climate 
change  
 
Though public interest litigation is used by 
lawyers globally, it is more developed in 
some legal traditions than in others. In the 
Indian and US national contexts, this form 
of litigation is particularly well established. 
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The following section will dissect some 
historical environmental public interest 
litigation cases with relevance to the 
climate change debate in the US and 
Indian contexts.  
India has a rich history of public 
interest litigation, which really started to 
take off as a legal mechanism in the 1980s. 
In SP Gupta v Union of India (1982), a 
seminal case for the development of this 
concept in the Indian context, the Supreme 
Court explicitly mentioned and gave 
meaning to public interest litigation.  
Following this judgement, there have been 
many Indian cases that conform to this 
definition, particularly in the realm of 
fundamental rights. In environmental 
matters, the Indian Supreme Court has 
taken an interventionist line, partly due to 
its strong tradition of judicial activism 
(Deva, 2009).  Public interest litigation is 
widely regarded as one of the most 
important legal innovations with regards 
to environmental protection in India (Sahu, 
2008).  There has been a long line of 
environmental public interest lawsuits, 
starting with the Dehradun valley 
litigation in 1983 (Ibid., p. 382-383).  In fact, 
the Indian Supreme Court’s public interest 
litigation guidelines specifically recognise 
the possibility of such claims ‘[…] 
pertaining to environmental pollution, 
disturbance of ecological balance, […], 
forest and wild life and other matters of 
public importance’ (Supreme Court of 
India, 2003, p. 2).  However, most of these 
environmental public interest lawsuits 
have no immediately apparent link to 
climate change. One interesting case, 
which is illustrative of the Indian 
approach, and has some relevance to 
climate change, is Mehta v Union of India 
(2002), in which the Supreme Court 
ordered the government to replace the 
entire bus fleet of Delhi by more 
environmentally friendly Compressed 
Natural Gas (CNG) buses. Though the 
issue of climate change was not explicitly 
mentioned in the Court’s reasoning, the 
case is demonstrative of how 
environmental public interest litigation can 
be used indirectly as a tool for climate 
change mitigation. Additionally, due to the 
prevalence of such cases in India and the 
Court’s activist role, a case in relation to 
climate change would certainly not be 
inconceivable (Gupta, 2007).   
The US has a history of public 
interest litigation that finds its roots in the 
civil rights activism of the 1950s and 60s. 
Brown v Board of Education, in which the 
US Supreme Court found segregation in 
public schools unconstitutional, is often 
cited as the first example of this form of 
litigation (Hershkoff, 2005). In the US, 
recent years have seen an explosion of 
climate change litigation before the courts. 
One important vehicle that has been 
employed is initiating public nuisance tort 
claims (Hester, 2013). Though the 
conceptual delimitation of public nuisance 
is not entirely clear, an indicative 
definition is provided by the second US 
Restatement of Torts, which defines it as, 
‘an unreasonable interference with a right 
general to the common public’ 
(Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B, 







change lawsuit was the unsuccessful AEP 
v Connecticut case, but numerous other 
attempts followed (Hester, 2013). One case 
of particular interest is Comer v Murphy 
Oil USA, Inc. (2009). In this case, which 
went to the fifth circuit Court of Appeals 
before being dismissed, Mississippi 
residents sought to sue energy companies 
for contributing to global warming, and 
thus exacerbating the effects of Hurricane 
Katrina. A similar case, Kivalina v 
ExxonMobil (2012), saw Alaska residents 
suing oil companies over melting 
permafrost caused by greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions.  Though these cases 
have not yielded successful results to date, 
they present an interesting legal technique 
in the struggle against climate change. 
When it comes to filing suit against the 
federal government for climate change, the 
Massachusetts v EPA case entailed an 
interesting application of state-initiated 
public interest litigation (Welti, 2008). 
After its petition asking the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate GHG 
emissions from new motor vehicles under 
the Clean Air Act (CAA) was denied, 
Massachusetts appealed this decision in 
the courts. In Massachusetts v EPA (2007), 
the Supreme Court found, without 
imposing a specific obligation to regulate, 
that the EPA had the authority to regulate 
GHGs, and remanded the case to the EPA, 
requiring the agency to review its 
reasoning, as its argumentation had been 
inadequate. On remand, the EPA found 
that six GHGs met the threshold of 
endangering public health and welfare 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2009). 
Thus, though the Supreme Court exercised 
judicial restraint in its judgement, this kind 
of state-initiated public interest litigation 
can serve as an effective tool to address 
climate change.  
An exhaustive study of historical 
global public interest litigation cases with 
relevance to climate change is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  However, the US and 
Indian case studies serve as illustrative 
examples, and are particularly interesting 
for a number of reasons. Significantly, both 
India and the US have an extensive history 
of public interest litigation in their 
domestic legal systems, and belong to the 
world’s greatest emitters of GHGs. A 
comparison between the two can also yield 
some thought-provoking insights. It is for 
example interesting that, despite the strong 
culture of judicial activism and public 
interest litigation in India, there have been 
no cases directly addressing climate 
change. Conversely, in the US, where these 
concepts are often approached with more 
caution, numerous claims have been 
brought, albeit with limited success.  
 
III. Present emergence of 
climate change public 
interest litigation  
 
Starting with the Urgenda case in 2015, a 
new type of public interest litigation has 
started to gain currency in the courts. A 
subsequent ruling with comparative value 
occurred in Leghari v Pakistan, and further 
insights can be gained by looking at 
ongoing lawsuits in the United States, 
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Belgium, and Norway. These cases differ 
from the historical examples discussed 
above in that they hold the state directly 
responsible for climate change. Thus, the 
form of public interest litigation they 
embody appears to have tremendous 
potential in terms of influencing state 
policy, and encouraging social change. The 
following section seeks to further explain 
and compare these case studies.   
In the Urgenda case, a non-
governmental organisation (NGO) named 
Urgenda brought suit against the Dutch 
state. They argued that the government 
climate policy violated a duty of care 
under Dutch law, and the fundamental 
rights of Urgenda, as well as 886 
individual plaintiffs, under the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). To 
remedy this transgression, they claimed 
the government would have to readjust its 
low emissions reduction targets, which 
were set at 17 percent by 2020 compared to 
1990 levels at the time, to the 25-40 percent 
suggested in the Cancun agreements 
(Urgenda Foundation v. State of the 
Netherlands, 2015, para. 3.1). In their 
submission, they referred to national law, 
most notably article 21 of the Dutch 
Constitution, regional law, including 
articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR, as well as 
international treaty law and legal 
principles. The Dutch state contested these 
allegations, arguing that such an 
intervention in policymaking by the courts 
would violate the separation of powers. 
They also noted that the climate targets 
were in line with EU policy, and that the 
Dutch contribution to climate change was 
rather insignificant on a global scale. This 
final argument would suggest that the 
correct solution should be found through 
multilateral talks, in which the Dutch 
government’s negotiation position would 
allegedly be weakened by a judgement in 
Urgenda’s favour (Ibid., para 4.100).  On 24 
June 2015, the Hague District Court ruled 
in favour of the plaintiffs, finding that the 
state had violated a duty of care under 
Dutch law and ordering it to readjust its 
targets to at least 25 percent reduction by 
2020 (Ibid., para. 5.1). All other claims, 
including the argument under the ECHR, 
were dismissed. The Dutch government 
has launched an appeal and, accordingly, 
the District Court’s decision will be 
reviewed by the Hague Court of Appeal, 
and potentially the Dutch Supreme Court.   
The Court’s reasoning merits some 
further discussion. The prevailing claim 
was ultimately that the Dutch government 
had breached a duty of care pursuant Book 
6, Section 162 of the Dutch Civil Code, 
which was informed inter alia by article 21 
of the Dutch Constitution, and various 
international obligations and legal 
principles (Ibid., para. 4.89). Significantly, 
whereas NGOs or individuals before 
national courts cannot usually invoke 
international obligations between states, 
this approach permitted the inclusion of 
international law through the so-called 
‘reflex effect’ (de Graaf & Jans, 2015). The 
Court found a duty of a ‘high level’ of care, 
resulting in the required establishment of a 
satisfactory statutory framework to reduce 
emissions. Interestingly, the environmental 







as Urgenda itself could not rely on articles 
2 and 8 of the ECHR on the right to life and 
private and family life, and the Court 
found that there was insufficient infor-
mation to assess the separate claim put 
forward on behalf of the 886 individual 
plaintiffs (Urgenda Foundation v. State of 
the Netherlands, 2015, para. 4.109).  Thus, 
even though the Court stopped short of 
confirming the validity of the ECHR 
argument, it also did not explicitly reject it. 
Internationally, this judgement was the 
first to hold the state responsible for 
climate change, and it certainly constituted 
a significant breakthrough in the Dutch 
context. Furthermore, it could be argued 
that this ruling indicates the onset of a 
broader global trend. The case studies that 
follow appear to suggest that such a trend 
may indeed be underway. 
Another notable climate change 
public interest case that was inspired by 
the example of  Urgenda is currently 
taking place in Belgium. The Belgian case, 
which mirrors the Dutch case in its 
arguments, was initiated by the NGO 
‘klimaatzaak vzw’, established by 11 
Belgian celebrities, with a parallel claim by 
a large number of individuals. The 
plaintiffs argue that the Court should 
order the Belgian government to reduce 
emissions by 40, or at least 25 percent 
compared to 1990 levels by 2020, and 87.5, 
or at least 80 percent by 2050 (Summons of 
the Belgian climate case, 2015, para. 14). 
The claim is that the current government 
policy is in violation of human rights, 
specifically article 2 and 8 of the ECHR, as 
well as article 7bis, 22, and 23 of the 
Belgian Constitution on sustainable 
development, the protection of public 
health, and the right to the protection of a 
healthy living environment. Additionally, 
it is argued that the Belgian government is 
in violation of the principle of prevention, 
the precautionary principle, and a duty of 
care under Belgian law (Ibid., para. 43). 
The proceedings are momentarily delayed 
due to a language dispute over whether 
the case should be heard in French or 
Dutch.             
In September 2015, the Lahore High 
Court became the second to hold the state 
responsible for climate change in Ashgar 
Leghari v Pakistan (2015). It is noteworthy 
that Pakistan, like its neighbour India, also 
has a long history of public interest 
litigation (Razzaque, 2004). In this 
particular case, Ashgar Leghari filed suit 
against the government for its inaction in 
relation to climate change, especially its 
failure to implement the National Climate 
Change Policy (NCCP). The argument was 
that the government had violated the 
fundamental rights to life and dignity 
under articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution 
(Ashgar Leghari v Pakistan, 2015, p. 2, 
para. 1).  The Court found in favour of the 
plaintiff, ordering the government to take 
numerous specific actions to remedy this 
offence. Several government ministries 
were ordered to appoint a ‘climate change 
focal person’ to monitor the imple-
mentation of the NCCP. Additionally, the 
Court even went so far as to create a 
Climate Change Commission (Ibid., p. 5, 
para. 7).   
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The reasoning in Leghari v Pakistan 
is interesting in that it differed from 
Urgenda on a number of points. Notably, 
Leghari concerned an omission by the 
state. Moreover, public interest litigation 
and judicial activism are more accepted in 
the Pakistani legal system than in the 
Dutch context. It is thus not surprising 
that, in some ways, the Pakistani 
judgement appears even more progressive 
than Urgenda. The Lahore court expressly 
accepted the fundamental rights argument, 
from which the judges shied away in the 
Netherlands. Additionally, the Dutch 
judges went out of their way to exercise 
some degree of restraint, by choosing the 
lower bound of the 25-40 percent standard 
as an obligation, and refraining from 
prescribing specific tasks for the 
government to perform (Urgenda 
Foundation v. State of the Netherlands, 
2015, para. 5.1). The Lahore court, on the 
other hand, determined the specific actions 
that the government was required to take, 
and even named the 21 individuals to be 
appointed to the Climate Change 
Commission (Ashgar Leghari v Pakistan, 
2015, p. 7, para. 8(iii)). Ultimately, 
however, the central difference between 
the cases comes down to two different 
legal arguments with potential for future 
litigation, the duty of care argument and 
the fundamental rights argument.        
On 8 April 2016, another interesting 
development took place in Kelsey Cascade 
Rose v the United States of America. In this 
case, the plaintiffs are 21 children from 
around the US aged 9 to 18, and climate 
scientist Dr. James Hansen on behalf of 
future generations (Kelsey Cascade Rose v 
the United States of America, 2016, p. 1, 
para. 2). In its order denying the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Oregon 
District Court found that the plaintiffs’ 
claims could move forward to trial. The 
plaintiffs allege that the government’s 
actions and omissions in relation to climate 
change amount to a violation of their 
substantive due process rights, their right 
to equal protection under the fifth 
amendment of the US Constitution, as well 
as an implicit right to a stable climate 
under the ninth amendment. The claim is 
that the government's policy ‘has resulted 
in a danger of constitutional proportions to 
the public health’ (Kelsey Cascade Rose v 
the United States of America, 2016, p. 10, 
para. 1).  Thus, as in the aforementioned 
Leghari case, the claim is firmly rooted in 
rights rhetoric. However, the judge also 
explicitly mentions the Urgenda case in 
this order, rejecting the argument that the 
fact that the GHG emissions only form a 
portion of the global whole meant that the 
claim should be dismissed in this instance 
(Kelsey Cascade Rose v the United States 
of America, 2016, p. 11, para. 2). Thus, even 
though it is questionable whether the 
plaintiffs’ arguments will succeed at trial, 
this case study does go to show that 
climate change public interest litigation is 
also gaining traction in the US context. 
 In Norway, a similar case, aiming 
to hold the government responsible for its 
allegedly unconstitutional oil exploration 
in the Arctic, is underway.  In the People v. 
Arctic Oil, The claimants, Greenpeace 







(Nature & Youth), argue that the 
Norwegian government's Licensing 
Decision, which opened up new acreage to 
oil and gas companies in the Arctic Barents 
Sea, is illegal under Norwegian law. 
Specifically, they claim a violation of 
Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution 
on the right to a healthy environment. 
Additionally, it is argued that a procedural 
irregularity occurred, as the impacts of the 
decision were not properly assessed (Writ 
of Summons in the People v. Artic Oil, p. 
5-7). The case presents another example of 
environmental rights being mobilised in 
the public interest.     
The case studies described above 
seem to suggest that public interest 
litigation seeking to hold states responsible 
for climate change may be taking hold as a 
legal mechanism. Before dismissing these 
examples as context-specific, it must be 
noted that the cases stretch across three 
continents, and have occurred in both 
common and civil law jurisdictions. 
Nonetheless, though they share like 
features, the respective courts’ reasonings 
differ. Especially interesting in this regard 
is the distinction between the clear 
fundamental rights approach in Leghari, 
and the duty of care method that prevailed 
in Urgenda. The following section will 
attempt to deepen the analysis of public 
interest litigation as a possible driver for 
climate change mitigation on the basis of a 






The emergence of this new type of climate 
change public interest raises important 
questions. Significantly, does this develop-
ment constitute a global trend? and, if so, 
can these climate cases really bring about 
the necessary social change? Additionally, 
are these cases (dangerous) examples of 
judicial activism? Finally, the distinction 
between the duty of care approach 
endorsed in the Urgenda case and the 
fundamental rights argument accepted by 
the Lahore court in Leghari merits some 
further scrutiny. The question here is 
which legal argumentation has more 
potential for climate change litigation?  
The cases mentioned in the analysis above 
do seem to suggest a global trend in the 
making. 
In the Netherlands and Pakistan, 
claimants already successfully held the 
state responsible for climate change. 
Similar ongoing cases can be identified in 
the US, Belgian, and Norwegian national 
contexts. The diversity of the domestic 
jurisdictions in which these cases occur 
seems to deny the argument that this kind 
of public interest litigation is context-
specific. The cases cut across continents 
and involve both common and civil law 
systems. Notably, the Netherlands shares 
common roots with a number of European 
legal systems, and Pakistan’s neighbours, 
India and Bangladesh, have similar 
traditions of public interest litigation and 
judicial activism (Razzaque, 2004). 
However, the dismissal of some of the 
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ongoing cases could dull the enthusiasm 
surrounding this new technique. In this 
regard, the outcomes of other ongoing 
climate cases will be important in 
determining whether this emerging global 
trend solidifies into more established 
international practice.                 
Regarding the potential for 
encouraging social change, it has been 
argued that public interest litigation 
cannot bring about institutional reform per 
se, and can draw attention away from 
more effective (political) strategies 
(Cummings & Rhode, 2009). In this regard, 
it must be stressed that these climate cases 
are insufficient to resolve the dilemma of 
climate change on their own. Ultimately, it 
is up to political decision-making to 
address this global challenge. However, 
public interest litigation can contribute to 
tackling climate change in a number of 
ways. Firstly, the courts can encourage 
policymakers to act, and comply with their 
existing obligations. Secondly, climate 
change public interest litigation can 
contribute to awareness-raising. High 
profile climate cases against the state bring 
climate change into the public eye, 
enhancing the visibility of this issue. 
Finally, the potential for legal mobilisation 
is tremendous, as illustrated by the Belgian 
climate case, which involves over 10,000 
individual co-plaintiffs (Belgian climate 
case website, n.d.).  Mobilising citizens in 
the struggle against climate change can be 
essential in refocusing the priorities of 
society. Particularly striking is the new 
Chinese environmental protection law, 
which recognises the urgency of the air 
pollution problem, and seeks to mobilise 
citizens by taking a relatively liberal 
approach to environmental public interest 
litigation, reflecting the Chinese state’s 
increased focus on sustainability in view of 
the current economic slowdown 
(Carpenter-Gold, 2015).                
As explained in the concept-
ualisation section, public interest lawsuits 
are often linked to judicial activism, which 
broadly entails judges pushing the 
boundaries of existing law for political 
purposes. Judicial activism may take on 
varying meanings depending on the 
context of a commentator’s observations, 
or the jurisdiction in which a lawsuit 
occurs. Though it is not always clear 
whether a ruling constitutes judicial 
activism, the progressive climate change 
cases discussed above, particularly the 
Urgenda case, have been labelled as such. 
Specifically, the Dutch government 
position is that the Court did not respect 
the separation of powers in its decision, a 
claim that was dismissed by the Hague 
District Court in its ruling (Urgenda 
Foundation v. State of the Netherlands, 
2015, paras. 4.94-4.102).  In this regard, it is 
important to note that, whereas the Dutch 
court’s interpretation was certainly 
progressive, it was based in existing 
principles of law (Heringa, 2016, p. 3). Loth 
and van Gestel (2015) also gave a more 
positive appreciation of Urgenda, placing 
the ruling in the context of multi-level 
governance, and noting that, in light 
thereof, judges seek to contribute to 
providing solutions for complex 







approach of the Hague District Court can 
be likened to civil rights cases in the US, 
where the courts found underlying legal 
principles, which were interpreted in a 
new way (The Guardian, 2015). Thus, 
while the Court may have exercised a fair 
degree of interpretative freedom, it is not 
clear-cut that this case would amount to 
judicial activism as such. The question, 
which will be addressed on appeal, is 
whether the Court only pushed the 
boundaries of existing law, or transgressed 
them, in its ruling.  It must also be noted 
that, where conservatives in the US often 
describe judicial activism as something 
used by liberals to circumvent the 
requirements of the law, it is not only a 
liberal tactic. A recent example would be 
the Supreme Court’s stay of the 
implementation of the Obama 
administration’s Clean Power Plan (CPP) 
pending judicial review (Ryan, 2016).   
The cases discussed in this paper 
seem to employ two different legal 
arguments. In Urgenda, the Court upheld 
the claim that there was a duty of care 
under Dutch law informed by 
constitutional and international law. By 
contrast, in the Leghari case, the Pakistani 
court found that the fundamental rights of 
the claimant had been violated. The 
relative power of these two arguments 
depends largely on the jurisdiction. It is 
noteworthy that, in the Urgenda case, the 
claimants also put forward a fundamental 
rights claim. The argument that article 2 
and 8 of the ECHR had been violated, was 
not explicitly rejected by the Court, and 
these rights were used to inform the duty 
of care (Urgenda Foundation v. State of the 
Netherlands, 2015, para. 4.52). Certainly, 
the environmental rights approach has a 
number of advantages. Significantly, rights 
rhetoric has tremendous potential for the 
mobilisation of citizens for a cause (Hilson, 
2015).  Additionally, human rights are 
universal in scope, and therefore this 
argument is applicable beyond the 
national boundaries of a single state. 
Hence, it could be employed in cases 
before regional courts such as the 
European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). There are however some 
drawbacks. The concept of environmental 
rights does not enjoy broad recognition, 
and this approach is likely to face 
difficulties in domestic jurisdictions that 
have a more restrictive traditional 
conception of human rights as civil and 
political rights. Thus, where rights claims 
are more ambitious, they may also be more 
challenging.  
The above analysis seems to suggest 
that this new breed of climate change 
public interest litigation cases constitutes 
an emerging global trend that could have 
enormous potential as a driver of social 
change. However, this technique can only 
encourage governments to take more 
effective action, and does not suffice in 
itself. Ultimately, it is the policymakers 
who must implement measures to tackle 
climate change. Therefore, though a 
progressive interpretation of the law does 
not necessarily amount to judicial activism, 
it would be wise for courts to exercise 
some judicial restraint, since it is not for 
judges to define policy. Restraint is 
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especially important as judicial activism is 
a double-edged sword, and can also be 
employed to curtail climate change 
mitigation policies, as illustrated by the US 
Supreme Court’s CPP stay. Finally, though 
environmental rights claims have a more 
universal applicability and a high 
propensity for legal mobilisation, they may 
also face severe challenges, particularly in 
jurisdictions with a more restrictive 
conception of human rights. The following 
section will attempt to shed some light on 
what these developments could imply for 
the future prospects of public interest 
litigation as a tool for encouraging climate 
change mitigation.       
  
V. Future prospects  
 
There are numerous threats and 
opportunities with regard to the future 
potential of climate change public interest 
litigation. Notably, continued enthusiasm 
over this technique depends on the 
outcome of certain ongoing cases. 
Substantial momentum could be gained by 
a victory on US soil in Kelsey Cascade 
Rose, or another successful European case 
in Norway or Belgium. However, a 
dismissal could have the opposite effect. 
Additionally, the problem of standing, 
particularly standing of NGOs, could 
present an obstacle. In assessing the future 
potential of this technique, some special 
attention should also be paid to the 
prospects of public interest litigation in the 
Chinese context, and before the ECtHR.          
One obstacle that can pose a threat 
to future climate change public interest 
litigation is the problem of standing in 
environmental cases. In the Dutch legal 
system, there is an established, though not 
uncontested, practice of granting standing 
to NGOs, but this practice may not be as 
well accepted in some other jurisdictions 
(Broek & Enneking, 2014). Proving the 
interest of the individuals or legal persons 
involved can cause difficulties, considering 
that climate change litigation often 
concerns future harm. These challenges 
were all too apparent in the Urgenda case 
where, with regards to the human rights 
argument, the judges denied Urgenda 
standing, and refrained from assessing the 
individual claims. The difficulty of 
establishing a causal link for potential 
future harm is also of particular relevance 
in cases of this nature. Furthermore, it is 
often unclear what portion of the damage 
can be attributed to the conduct of the 
defendant, especially considering the 
plurality of third parties that often 
contribute to the emissions. These 
obstacles, along with the challenge of 
relying on international obligations in a 
domestic context, can hinder climate 
change public interest litigation. However, 
the successes of the Urgenda and Leghari 
cases suggest that they may be overcome.         
References to the ECHR in the 
Dutch and Belgian climate cases raise the 
question of whether a state could be held 
responsible for climate change before the 
ECtHR. It must be noted that, as the Hague 
District Court reiterated, NGOs cannot 







individual rights violations. However, the 
potential standing of the individual 
claimants was essentially left unanswered. 
Certainly, some ECtHR case law appears 
to suggest that a climate case before the 
Court could have some potential of 
succeeding.   However, there are also 
numerous obstacles that have to be 
considered. For instance, there is no actio 
popularis under the ECHR, and, in 
general, there is need for a clear link in 
order to receive victim status (Loucaides, 
2005). Additionally, states are given a 
substantial margin of appreciation to 
pursue environmental objectives under the 
ECHR, and there is a requirement to 
exhaust local remedies (Boyle, 2006).  
Finally, it must be noted that the Court 
may opt to exercise judicial restraint in this 
regard with a view to political 
considerations.          
In the Chinese context, there have 
also been some instances of environmental 
public interest litigation. Considering its 
status as the largest polluter globally, the 
potential for environmental public interest 
lawsuits in China is of particular interest. 
China’s new environmental protection 
law, which came into force on 1 January 
2015, has opened some doors in this regard 
by, for instance, granting standing for 
NGOs to bring cases on behalf of the 
public, if they satisfy certain conditions 
(Liu, 2015).  It also enhances liability 
regimes for polluters and public officials 
who act in dereliction of their duties, 
leading ClientEarth CEO James Thornton 
to suggest that some of the law’s 
provisions are more advanced than those 
applicable in the UK context (Thornton, 
2015). Under this new legislation, which 
seeks to involve citizens in the struggle 
against pollution, an increase in public 
interest litigation is to be expected. 
However, it is unclear whether the shift is 
merely symbolic, or if it will have a more 
concrete impact. Additionally, bringing 
suit against government authorities in 
China is marred with difficulties, with 
cases often disappearing into a so-called 
‘black hole’ (Botsford, 2016). Significantly, 
judicial independence is lacking, and the 
socialist rule of law means that there is no 
clear hierarchy between the law and 
political practice (Peerenboom, 2015). 
Thus, where the new law is likely to 
enhance the effectiveness and frequency of 
environmental public interest litigation in 
China, much is dependent on how it is 
implemented, and there are limits to its 
potential.  
The future prospects of public 
interest litigation as a tool to tackle climate 
change merit some cautious optimism. 
Despite numerous obstacles, including the 
problem of standing and proving 
causation in climate change cases, other 
ongoing cases are already attempting to 
hold the state accountable for climate 
change, following the successes of 
Urgenda and Leghari. Climate change 
public interest litigation could also be used 
to bring cases before regional courts, 
particularly the ECtHR. However, it is 
unclear whether such claims would 
succeed. Significantly, public interest 
litigation has some potential as a 
mechanism in the Chinese context, 
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especially under the new environmental 
protection law, though it seems unlikely 
that a claim seeking to hold the state 
responsible for climate change would be 
successful in the Chinese context.  
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
The emerging trend of public interest cases 
holding the government responsible for 
climate change is an important 
breakthrough in climate litigation. This 
paper has sought to deepen the 
understanding of this phenomenon by 
elaborating on its historical context, 
analysing the present emergence of climate 
change public interest litigation, and 
assessing the future potential of this 
technique. It was found that these cases, 
which have revolutionised attitudes 
towards climate litigation, represent a 
trend in the making. The successful 
Urgenda and Leghari cases can serve to 
embolden the efforts of civil society 
pushing for climate action worldwide. 
Essentially, these examples demonstrate 
that it is possible for non-governmental 
actors to hold states responsible for climate 
change, something that seemed impossible 
or at least highly unlikely before. Perhaps 
this development alone can be presented 
as evidence of shifting attitudes, which in 
themselves indicate that social change is 
underway. Nonetheless, much depends on 
the outcomes of ongoing cases, particularly 
in Belgium, the US, and Norway, to ensure 
that this emerging trend solidifies. If this 
solidification occurs, climate change public 
interest litigation could also be taken to the 
regional level at, for instance, the ECtHR, 
in addition to various national 
jurisdictions. These findings suggest that 
the potential impact of this new method to 
address the widespread political 
intransigence with regard to climate 
change is significant. However, only the 
future can tell to what extent these climate 
cases will actually succeed in stimulating 
























1 US Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens remarked in relation to a series of cases viewed as activist 
that, “[…] with the benefit of hindsight I can say that I now agree with each of these examples of 
judicial activism” (Stevens, 2002, p. 26), and former Indian Chief Justice A. H. Ahmadi noted that 
judicial activism forms a necessary adjunct of the judicial function, seen as the main concern is the 
public as opposed to the private interest (Sathe, 2001, p. 30). 
 
2 The Court defined public interest litigation in para. 19A as “[…]litigation undertaken for the purpose of 
redressing public injury, enforcing public duty, protecting social, collective, 'diffused' rights and 
interests or vindicating public interest […]”.  
 
3 Other jurisdictions that have seen environmental public interest litigation include Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
the UK, and China. 
 
4  See the Dutch government website for an up-to-date overview of developments in the Urgenda case: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/klimaatverandering/inhoud/klimaatrechtszaak.  
 
5  See the Belgian climate case website for an up-to-date timeline of the proceedings: 
http://www.klimaatzaak.eu/nl/de-rechtszaak/#klimaatzaak.  
 
6  For legal arguments against Norwegian oil exploration in the Arctive see: Sjåfjell, B., & Halvorssen, A. 
M. (2015). The Legal Status of Oil and Gas Exploitation in the Arctic: The Case of Norway. Oil, Gas and 
Energy Law (OGEL), Special Issue September. 
 
7  For a more extensive coverage of the argument for climate change liability under the ECHR see: Cox, R. 
H. J. (2014). The Liability of European States for Climate Change. Utrecht Journal of International and  
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